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Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment
Fit the Crime*
Louis Lowensteint

You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd
disagrees with you. You are right because your data
and reasoning are right.'
Benjamin Graham

In the 1980s some things went right on Wall Street but much went
wrong. The fallout is still being felt today. Prudential Securities, which for
years boasted that "the most important thing we earn is your trust," now
apologizes for having systematically duped many of the hundreds of
thousands of investors who bought its limited partnership deals. Carl Icahn
boasted of having bought TWA, but leaving none of his own money there,
he succeeded only in leaving the flying public with twenty year-old aircraft
and poor service. Banks and insurance companies bankrolled so many new
buildings that we will not work off the excess until the end of the century, if
then. As we close the books on the worst era in modem U.S. financial
history, Prudential at least has the resources to make amends. Those
victimized by others must often grasp at straws.
This is a good time for a post-mortem. It is not widely recognized, but
scholars played an important role in the debacle, providing ingenious freemarket theories to justify some of the worst excesses. One such concept,
efficient market theory, contributed to the damage then and, in its various
mutations, continues to do so today.
* Reprinted with permission from The American Prospect, Spring 1994. © New
Prospect Inc.
t Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Finance & Law, Columbia University. This Article
is based on an indictment handed up atJerome Levy Institute, Bard College, October 7, 1993.
My thanks to Ron Gilson, Bob Kuttner and, as always, Roger Lowenstein for helpful
comments.
1. BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 287 (4th rev. ed. 1973).
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Even if you are not a student of financial economics, the phrase
"efficient market theory" sounds right. After all, the stock market is crudely
efficient: markets set the minute-to-minute value of stocks, the spreads
between bid and asked prices are very small, and commissions are as little
as two cents a share.
Efficient Market Theory (EMT), however, posits something more
radical. The principal version, and the one on which this indictment will
focus, states that we can trust the pricing of stocks. Supposedly, competition
among sophisticated investors enables the stock market to price stocks
"accurately"-that is, in accordance with our best expectations of companies'
long-term prospects. (The trading by nonprofessionals is said to be random
and of no net effect.) Supposedly, too, all relevant publicly available
information is analyzed by investors, and new data, such as earnings
releases, are quickly noted, digested, and then reflected in the share prices.
In short, stock prices, while not perfect, are as perfect as can be. There
are no better estimates of the fundamental value of a company and no systems
for beating the market. A corollary is that the wisest of us can do no better
than to buy the market as a whole; the rest of us can do far worse.
EMT rests on several quite controversial assumptions, the most striking
of which is the terribly convenient but circular assumption that mispriced
stocks cannot long exist because if they did, "smart money" investors/arbitrageurs would already have eliminated them. This when-all-elsefails assumption, so central to the theory, is also the source of the well-worn
joke about two economists walking across the campus who spy what seems
to be a twenty dollar bill. As the younger economist leans forward to
examine it, her older colleague restrains her. "If it really were a twenty
dollar bill," he says, "someone would already have picked it up. "2
Given the assumption that patience and intelligence are of no consequence, even a super-investor like Warren Buffett should not be able,
certainly not with any consistency, to find loose money lying on the table.
In fact, it would be a waste of his time to look.
As one of the high priests of EMT recently wrote, with visible pride, the
testing of the theory has itself become so voluminous as to be a "research
industry," and a mature one at that.3 I do not intend to go over that

2. For an analysis of why the stock market is less likely than others to be efficient,
see Louis Lowenstein, Book Review: Is Speculation "The EssentialNativeGenius oftthe Stock
Market"?, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 232 (1992).
3.

Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets:fI,46 J. FIN. 1575, 1599, 1607 (1991).
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voluminous, often dreary body of data. Much of it focuses on such
trivialities as the January effect-small company stocks are said to do better
in January-or how quickly the market responds to news of, say, a stock split
or dividend increase. How much do we really care, for example, that the
market reaches an equilibrium price one day after the announcement of a
dividend change, unless we have somehow assumed-what is of course the
critical issue-that the price was right to begin with? Because if it were not,
whether it takes one day or six is irrelevant.
Instead, I want to look beyond the market and to sound a wider alarm.4
Like some computer virus, EMT, the notion of "trusting prices," has spread
far beyond its origins as a scholarly study of the trading market. Having
long ago left its academic chrysalis, EMT has not only contaminated issues
and analyses in Wall Street, but also in executive offices on Main Street, that
would not have seemed to have been at risk, and in ways that are poorly
understood. Scholars might harbor reservations about some aspects of EMT,
but with their encouragement (and never a word of reproof) much of America
now drinks its market efficiency "straight up," taking EMT as much for
granted as the light bulb in the ceiling or the air we breathe.
The defendant, EMT, is hereby indicted. The indictment is limited to
four counts. EMT, we shall see, is guilty of:
(1) providing the intellectual cover for the excesses in junk bonds
and takeovers in the 1980s, ignoring the mounting evidence,
visible even then, that important sectors of the economy and
innocent bystanders were in jeopardy;
(2) encouraging investors and executives to indulge the fantasy that
they can "trust prices" to balance risk and reward and thereby
save themselves the enormous bother of analyzing businesses;
(3) aiding and abetting the efforts of the Business Roundtable and
other interest groups to strip voting and other basic shareholder
4.

There is a growing, typically younger, group of dissidents. See Robert J. Shiller,

Who's Mindingthe Store?, in THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

FUND TASK FORCE
ON MARKET SPECULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE27 (1992). The empirical studies

of efficient market theory have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere and from various points
of view. See id.; see also MARSHALL E. BLUME & JEREMY J. SIEGEL, THE THEORY OF
SECURITY PRICING AND MARKET STRUCTURE 14-27 (1992); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD
S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (forthcoming 1995);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1989); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,

Assumptions and SecuritiesRegulation:MarketEfficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851
(1992).
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rights and have them treated as saleable bits of private property;
and
(4) justifying a theory of dividend policy that encourages wasteful
corporate investment and expansion.
The result is that our financial markets have become increasingly desocialized, shuffling bits of paper and computer analytics in response to their own
internalized signals, with too little regard for the real companies, workers and
products that are the markets' reason for being.
Count 1: Promotingthe "Marketfor CorporateControl"
For financial economists, the merger boom of the 1980s was the stuff
of dreams. Since 1932, when Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means first
described the separation of ownership and control in the modern, publiclyheld corporation, observers had wrestled with the dilemma that corporate
democracy did not work, that these dispersed shareholders had very limited
power, and that corporate managers were able to avoid any serious oversight
or discipline. Then at the beginning of the 1980s there blossomed a shiny
new economic model, affectionately called the market for corporate control,
which saw the emerging takeover boom as a natural selection device for
replacing the poor performers. 5 The model is an appealing one. Given an
efficient stock market, of which few economists then had any doubt, poor
managerial performance would drive down a company's stock price to the
point where it would pay a more talented group to bid a substantial premium
for control, fire the incumbents and run the business themselves. Indeed, in
a market as efficient as the one in the model, there could be no other
systematic reason for takeovers.
Glory be, the merchants of deals on Wall Street could scarcely believe
their ears. Long accustomed to being vilified on Main Street, they were now
being heralded all across the scholarly landscape-and by high government
officials trained by scholars-as the avenging angels of economic revival.
Academics, in turn, who had never before seen their theories played out on
a trillion dollar scale, were quite prepared to testify that all of this would
improve the efficiency of American industry.

5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982). For an early and particularly uncritical defense of takeovers,
see Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
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In the hot summer of their triumph, scholars and their converts-none
of them baptized more thoroughly than Ronald Reagan's Council of
Economic Advisers 6-ignored the perverse incentives and palpable imperfections that drove this market, eventually to wild excess. The story has been
widely told in its several variations, but the basic system for takeovers and
leveraged buyouts worked like this: Take a not-too-glamorous business, but
one with decent prospects, and buy it with as much borrowed money as the
banks will lend. As the market heated up, however, even these standards
deteriorated. The investment by the new owners became hard to find, and
under the pressure to make ever more deals, the prices became absurd.
Structured with no room for a disappointment of any kind, these takeovers
left many viable businesses-typically household names-and once-loyal
workers and communities on the dole. The business casualties-the walking
wounded as well as the outright failures-would fill many pages. Here are
a few (see box):

Real Casualitiesof Market Theory
National Gypsum
Grand Union
Jim Walter Corp.
R.H. Macy
Federated Department Stores
Fruehauf
Lincoln Savings & Loan
West Point Pepperell
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Zale
Revco Drug
Centrust Savings & Loan
Carter Hawley Hale
Memorex/Telex

Texas Air International
Seaman's Furniture
USG (Gypsum)
Southmark
Trans World Airlines
Interco
Integrated Resources
Southland
SCI Holdings
Telemundo
Ames Department Stores
Ohio Mattress
Continental Airlines
Kindercare

6. EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 99-19, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 199 (1985).
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How did it happen? EMT provided the justification. In an efficient
market, one in which the stock market could not undervalue corporate assets
in any meaningful way, efficiency/productivity enhancement justifies
takeovers. While this was somewhat obscured by euphemisms, such as that
the takeover market is one in which managers "compete for the right to
manage resources, t " the basic implication was that higher bidders can manage
assets better and that the higher share price is the measure of the prospective
improvement.
On a modest scale, hostile takeovers are a useful idea, but even in the
eighties the gaps in the theory were evident:7
* If target company managements were not striving to do the best
for their shareholders, how sure could one be that bidder
managements were doing so for their own? (Indeed the history
of the already failed conglomerate era should have raised
doubts.)
* The extraordinary availability of borrowed money was soon
allowing promotional buyers, having no operating experience and
little resources of their own, to acquire major industrial/commercial enterprises.
" The tax gains generated by the substitution of debt for equity-the elimination of the corporate income tax-alone accounted
for a substantial portion of the "value" being created in these
buyouts.
" There were substantial numbers of bids for palpably wellmanaged targets, not the laggards assumed by the model.
" The premium prices being paid by bidders, averaging at times as
much as eighty percent over the prevailing price in the market,
should have raised concerns as to the likelihood of such consistently large efficiency gains.
" The unprecedented level of fees being earned by bankers and
kindred promoters, which soon dwarfed everything else on Wall
Street, suggested that efficiency gains may not have been the
sole, or even primary, object of the game.

7. Fora contemporaneous discussion, see EdwardHerman and Louis Lowenstein, The
Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT
OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 211 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988) (one of a group of papers
delivered at a 1985 conference at Columbia).
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Alas, EMT had blinded scholars, and others, too, to what was now
painfully clear in the marketplace: the deals were not making sense-to
anyone but the middlemen. All through the latter part of the 1980s, when the
preponderance of takeovers was happening, the prices being paid for
significant targets, on average, were over fourteen times earnings before
interest and taxes. That amounted to a return of seven percent, even while
the bidders were then paying on average ten to eleven percent for capital.'
The rule-of-thumb was ninety percent debt, ten percent equity. On a multibillion dollar deal, the deficit can add up quickly.
Compared to stocks, the yardsticks for debt, such as the ratio of earnings
to interest charges, are not very complex, there being many fewer variables.
For AA-rated bonds, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) should cover
interest charges six or more times over. (Since the bondholder will never get
more than his interest coupon, his overriding concern is safety.) For "good"
junk bonds the coverage may be no more than two times, leaving much less
room for adversity. By the mid-eighties even this good junk had been driven
from the market.
The damage has been long lasting. In financial terms, the loss was not
just the high default rate, the failed savings and loans and other direct costs.
As a recent Federal Reserve Bank of New York study has shown, there has
been a continuing need for refinancings devoted less to real investments than
to restoring shattered balance sheets. 9 In human terms, it was a story of
workers and middle managers who had long ago invested their careers in the
various target companies of the day, but who, unlike senior management,
could not protect themselves.
Neoclassical economists now concede that leveraged-buyout magnates
like Robert Campeau, who sought control of many of the nation's department
store groups, might have bid too high-that there is a hubris factor which
produces a sort of winner's curse. But the concession is little more than an
effort to control the damage to their prized theory. Campeau, like many
another, could buy a major company, say, Allied Stores, investing no more
of his own capital than necessary to pay the (not trivial, of course) fees of the
bankers and lawyers. The actual purchase price, the only money still at risk,

8. BARRIE A. WIGMORE, SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE 1980s (forthcoming 1995);
Barrie A. Wigmore, The Declinein Credit Quality of New-Issue Junk Bonds, FIN. ANALYSIS
J., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 53, 54.
9. Eli M. Remolona et al., CorporateRefinancing in the 1990s, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y. Q. REV., Winter 1992-93, at 1.
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came from a broad cross section of the banking and financial community here
and abroad. It was the hubris of this far-flung institutional market, not just
a handful of manic/depressives, that accounted for the excesses. Come to
think of it, given their ability to control extraordinary amounts of institutional
money with few constraints-First Boston, for example, chafing for fees,
virtually threw capital at Campeau-the Campeaus of the day may have been
the most rational players in the game.
Remarkably enough, there has not been a single serious effort by such
defenders of EMT as Harvard financial economist Michael Jensen, Nobelist
Merton Miller, or other traditional finance scholars to retrace their steps, to
see how it was that excessive debt increased risk, instead of merely
rearranging the risk as their models had forecast. The best I see, and it is
really not very good at all, are concessions that mistakes were made, but we
learn from our mistakes and are not likely to repeat those particularones
again.'" ("An efficient market, sir, is one in which we succumb to different
illusions at different times.")
Count 2: Offering Booze to PerennialDrunks
Ever since Benjamin Graham and David Dodd," and John Maynard
Keynes wrote in the 1930s, we have known that the traders and other
professionals on Wall Street by and large lack the temperament to invest
money on a rational, long-term basis. Graham early on, others of us later
on, preached the rewards of ignoring the stock market except when the
manic/depressive behavior occasionally offered opportunities to buy or sell
on an advantageous basis.
Preach as one might, Keynes knew from the beginning that it would be
an uphill fight.'" Given, he observed, the, uncertainties affecting any
business and its competition, Keynes concluded that there was not a sufficient
basis for calculated mathematical projections. As business people (and stock
pickers, too), we take the next best, much more comfortable course. We
assume that the present state of the world-the economy, politics, war,
drought, and whatever-represents a state of equilibrium that will continue

10. For a striking example of such denial, see Donald Chew, CharlesPonzi'sDisciple,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1993, at A10.
11.

BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (lst ed. 1934).

12.

JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND

MONEY 152 (1st ed. 1936).
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indefinitely into the future until something happens to disturb it. We assume,
too, that stock market valuations (and other markets' as well) reflect
everything there is to know about business realities and prospects, and that
they will only change as new information appears.
EMT now offers up a sacramental blessing to those who would like to
believe the Wall Street dogma: "Don't argue with the tape."
Far from approving of this myopia, Keynes was deeply concerned. The
"social object of skilled investment," Keynes wrote, "should be to defeat the
dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future." 3 For us
preachers, past and present, it is indeed discouraging to see today's scholars
dignify, with complex algebraic formulas and computer run-offs, the notion
that it is foolish to argue with the tape, that thinking is a waste. Certainly we
should not pick stocks.
What, defendant says-yes, we permit a word for the defendant-has
been the damage? First, it lies in the extraordinary growth of index funds.
A fund manager, persuaded that stocks are as correctly priced as can be,
saves herself the bother and buys the market as a whole, or an index such as
the Standard& Poor's500, as a proxy for the market. Indexers rely heavily
on the history that stocks, on average and over time, have performed much
better than, say, bonds. But theirs is a truncated view of history, one that at
best ignores the proven importance of buying in when market values are at
historically sustainable levels. Are the levels today sustainable? Sorry, the
question is out of order, one that an EMT-indexer is sworn not to ask.
Indexing confounds the essential logic of a discriminating capitalism-that we move capital and assets to higher valued uses. We all know not
to put all our eggs in one basket. But EMT goes far beyond the usual
dictates of prudence. Quoting again John Maynard Keynes, who had an
enviable investment record with several insurance company and Kings
College funds:
To suppose that safety-first consists in having a
small gamble in a large number of different directions ....

as compared with a substantial stake in

a company where one's information is adequate,
4
strikes me as a travesty of investment policy.'

13.

7 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 155 (1973).

14. 12 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 82 (Donald
Moggridge ed., 1983).
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True, there are many roads to heaven, though I doubt there is any
substitute for studying annual reports, as Buffett does with hundreds a year.
But it is odd, is it not, that not one EMT theorist has seen fit to study Buffett?
Since he began managing money independently thirty-five years ago, first at
the Buffett Partnership and now at Berkshire Hathaway, through strong
markets and weak, he has produced average annual rates of return of over
twenty-seven percent. For thirty-five years he has been steadily mining the
imperfect prices that EMT says do not exist!
The response to Buffett has been either a deafening silence or a clumsy
attempt to avoid the engagement. '
He is said to be a five-sigma
event-someone whose performance is five standard deviations superior to
the norm-so that as a statistical matter he can safely be ignored. The idea
seems to be that if we believe pitchers are now so "efficient" that no one
can hit .300, we should study large numbers of average hitters, rather than
a star who has systematically studied the pitchers and the elements of
hitting, and best of all is willing to impart that knowledge. 6 Or as The
Economist suggested in August, 1992, echoing the academic dogma: in any
coin-tossing contest, no matter how many rounds, someone will survive to
win, but the identity of the winner is of no consequence. 7 Thus, Buffett
is explained: thirty-five lucky flips in a row. Or a few months later, in
December, that same always-in-touch journal suggested that Buffett's
success is attributable to his having used the "simple trading rule" of buying
shares with relatively low ratios of market price to book value.'" Too bad,
in its eagerness The Economist had not bothered to notice that among
Buffett's most profitable investments have been companies such as
American Express, bought in the 1960s, and Coca-Cola in the 1980s, or
that he has written frequently of the irrelevance of tangible book values.

15. See in addition to the celebrated annual reports, available on a phone call to
Omaha, Warren E. Buffett, The Superinvestorsof Graham-and-Doddsville,HERMES, Fall
1984, at 4. See V. Eugene Shahan, Are Short-Term Performance and Value Investing
Mutually Exclusive?, HERMES, Spring 1984, at 26, 28 (noting that superior results are
available only to those with patience to underperform market for extended periods).
16. Large numbers of studies show that average returns for mutual funds match the
market, more or less, which is pretty much like saying that the average is the average.
BLUME & SIEGEL, supra note 4, at 20-21.
17.

The Stock-Picking Fallacy, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1992, at 15.

18. Beating the Market: Yes, It Can Be Done, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 21,
22 [hereinafter Beating the Market].
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Referring to Buffett, the chief international investment officer of
Bankers Trust in London recently quoted his "favourite business school
professor" as saying "75 years of quarterly data were required to establish
statistically meaningful index outperformance."' 19 Ergo, Nolan Ryan was

not a strikeout artist; he only did it for thirty years.
EMT and indexing also stand accused-and this is ultimately the more
important aspect of the charge-of being destructive of that basic aspect of
capitalism, watching the managers in the store. For an indexer, of course,
stocks are homogeneous commodities, as finance teachers say, and there is
no need to name the companies in the portfolio, much less know or monitor
them. Do they inquire into company-by-company prospects and performance? Do they watch the managements? No, that is not what they do.
A second remarkable application of EMT goes by the euphonious
acronym CAPM (pronounced CAP-M). This capital asset pricing model,
in substance, creates for stocks a measuring stick of risk and then calculates
the trade-off between risk and expected returns. Starting from the appealing
principle of no-free-lunch, CAPM states that not only is risk measurable but
that the expected payoffs, the rewards, are mechanically commensurate.
Increase your risk, as CAPM measures it, and your rewards will grow
apace.
Just how pervasive CAPM has become can be seen from a recent
survey of mutual funds in The New York Times, according to which each
fund falls into one of five categories of risk.2" How can they know, I
wondered? The answer was in the footnotes to the table. The Times, like
almost everyone else, has accepted the standard wisdom that prospective
risk can be measured. The Times assumed the existence of precise
arithmetic yardsticks for the outcomes of such palpably uncertain matters
as (investments in) the global oil business, discount retailing, pharmaceuticals-and I might add, newspapers-which are subject to political,
competitive and other factors that quite clearly are not measurable.
The Times had used a formula derived from CAPM which measures
the relative amount of historic short-term volatility of stock prices. As in
all versions of CAPM, the Times assumed that prospective long-term
business risk can be measured by looking at stock market fluctuations over
the short term-in this case, the monthly prices.

19.

Letter from Tony Thomson to Lou Lowenstein (Mar. 3, 1993).

20. HowMutualFundsPerformedThroughJune30, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at36.
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CAPM has insinuated itself into the language and framework of finance
so thoroughly that terms such as "risk-adjusted" and the "beta" of a stock
are widely used, usually with little comprehension of what a mischievous
model underlies them.2 CAPM confuses the past with the future and the
long- with the short-term. It stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that in the
typical business, there is no quantifiable risk, but only immeasurable
uncertainty. As Keynes and Frank Knight explained a long time ago, these
are two very different phenomena.'
The beta of Capital Cities/ABC is 1.0, the same as that of the market
index, but what could we possibly learn from that? The company owns a
variety of media properties, including newspapers and the ABC network.
Do we really believe that a computer, this remembrance of stock prices
past, can tell us that a business with an emerging technology and in a
changing regulatory environment will be no more or less risky over the next
decade than the market as a whole? Or as Keynes succinctly put it, it is not
simply that the calculation would be laborious, but rather that very little
rational basis may exist for numerical calculation and comparison of any
kind. z3
But wait, EMT and CAPM go still further. They say that the beta, or
some similar proxy for risk, measures not just the risk, but the expected
returns as well. If you want better than average results, buy a bunch of
super-risky, high beta stocks such as the new issue of the latest trendy
restaurant chain or biotech start-up. An extra dollop of profits will follow
the beta as the night the day. (And a good night to you.)
Encouraging money managers to substitute betas for careful research
and analysis is like offering Jack Daniels to an alcoholic. It is far too
tempting. The crime is that it has succeeded so well.
One of the patron saints of CAPM, Eugene Fama, recently announced
that the empirical basis for it had dried up.24 He had not given up the
search for a computerized proxy for measuring business risk, but he was
21. The beta of a stock is a measure of its price volatility relative to the market index,
which is set at 1.0. A stock with a beta below 1.0, therefore, is said to be less volatile and
less risky than the market as a whole.
22. KEYNES, supra note 12, at 149; FRANK H.
PROFIT 214, 226 (rev. ed. 1971).

23. JOHN M. KEYNES, A TREATISE ON

KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND

PROBABILITY

30 (1921).

24. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock
Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 427-29 (1992).
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now ready to look elsewhere. What followed is truly sad. Scholar on
scholar, and of course, The Economist, too, has said, well, CAPM may not
be correct, but we will continue to use it until something better comes
along.' And so have money managers, for whom a bad model seems to
be better than none at all.26 How are we to think about risk, they say,
without some computer-based, arithmetic proxy? While a beta may not
mean much, it has the one advantage that it is readily calculable.
Which is how it happened that the New York Times, perhaps unwittingly, aided and abetted an intellectual fraud.
Count 3: Stealing Shareholders' Votes
For roughly sixty years, the one share/one vote requirement of the
New York Stock Exchange set the standard, not just for companies listed
on the Big Board but for the market generally. This requirement not only
survived for almost three generations, but almost no one tried to fiddle with
it. It was an accepted part of the financial landscape that if a company
invited the public to invest, the public and the management would have,
share-and-share alike, equal voting rights. What changed was the pressure
of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, which many corporate managers sought
to escape by disenfranchising the public. No raider would pay a premium
price for low-voting common stock, or if he did, so what? Seeing that it
would lose listings to the over-the-counter market, which had no such
equal-voting requirement, the Big Board decided to abandon its longstanding rule and to allow a variety of limited-voting stocks.
The issue is currently on the table, requiring governmental action of
some sort. In 1988 the SEC adopted a rule that turned back the clock in
part, but still allowed all the organized markets to list and trade nonvoting
common shares-either of companies already public or just going public-under specified circumstances, such as if they were issued for cash.
The rule was overturned by the federal courts, however, and the entire issue

25. See, e.g., Louis K.C. Chan & Josef Lakonishok, Are the Reportsof Beta's Death
Premature, 19 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1993, at 51; Schools Brief.Risk and Return,
THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 72-73 (writing of questions raised earlier about CAPM);
Beating the Market, supra note 18, at 21. Not surprisingly, Fischer Black also believes that
CAPM still lives. Fischer Black, Beta and Return, 20 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 8 (1993).
According to the popular Black-Scholes option pricing model, the value of an option depends
on the price volatility of the underlying stock; if CAPM is dead, goodbye Black-Scholes.
26.

Cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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has now been dumped back into the lap of the Commission and ultimately
perhaps Congress, too.27 Companies are now issuing these dual-class
common stocks in greater numbers. What to do?
One would have expected free market economists to recoil with horror
at the notion of shareholders without voting rights. Without votes, the
much loved market for corporate control would dry up. Much to my
surprise, and to the utter delight of the Business Roundtable, scholars
proceeded to marshal complex arguments to explain that new shareholders
might indeed prefer an arrangement under which they turn over their capital
with one hand and agree with the other that management will never, ever
be held accountable for the use of the money.
It seems odd, but inhabiting a world of (almost) perfect competition,
or at least one in which regulation is heavily suspect, many economists
believe that prices reflect essentially all potentialities, however remote. As
a practical matter, the controversy turns primarily on how to deal with
companies that go public for the first time-initial public offerings (IPOs).
These economists are saying that if investors don't get voting rights when
they buy new issues, they don't pay for them; and if they don't pay for
them, they have no cause to complain. More to the point, neither do the
rest of us. Voting rights are private property; there is no social interest in
preserving for the future the right to recall or dismiss a wayward board of
directors or CEO.
Whatever the value of such a laissez-faire policy might be otherwise,
in the context of the highly irrational, volatile IPO market, it is a triumph
of abstract theory over day-to-day reality. As investors scrambled to buy
shares of Boston Chicken when it went public last year, they gave it a
market value of $770 million, even though its projected sales (not earnings)
for the year were only $44 million. Knowing that the stock was likely to
be "hot," how were they conceivably going to price something as remote
in value as voting rights, assuming that they thought about them at all?
The Cambridge economist John Eatwell said, facetiously: "Ifthe world
is not like the model, so much the worse for the world."I I have never

27. In February 1994, with the tacit approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange proposed a new rule allowing the issuance and
listing of limited voting stocks. Objections have been raised and the outcome remains in
doubt.
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seen it seriously argued that the IPO market is efficient, even for the basics
of price and value. Compared to the ordinary stock market, itself hardly
a model of rationality, the IPO market is inferior in almost all respects.2 9
Continuity of volume is missing. Security analysts don't look at IPOs, and
for that and other reasons, there is a stunning imbalance of information
between buyers and sellers. (Buyers rarely see the prospectus that would
tell them about their nonvoting rights until after they have decided to buy.)
Transaction costs are very high-so high that the triple commissions alone
should alert us to the probability that the other attributes of a "rational
expectations" market are also likely to be absent.
Over the years, there have been few good studies of IPOs. But the
data are very consistent: IPOs are a bad deal, the market does not price the
product (new issues) properly. IPOs are bad in absolute terms, they are
worse on a time-weighted basis, and they are worse yet when compared to
the market as a whole. IPOs are, as one would expect, risky. CAPM tells
us that on average they should, therefore, outperform the market. Not so.
IPOs are a crapshoot. According to an extensive but informal 1985 study
by Forbes of almost 2,000 IPOs during the 1975-85 period, more than half
failed to show any profit from the offering price. 3° Nearly half the stocks
were down fifty percent or more compared to the market average. On
average the group was down twenty-two percent relative to the Standard&
Poor's500 stock index, and the average annual return for the group was
only about three percent. A more rigorous 1991 study by Professor Jay R.
Ritter produced very similar results."
In thus corrupting the public debate, the defendant EMT has rested its
entire case on an abstract notion of rational behavior that implies, in
Herbert Simon's words, "a complete, and unattainable, knowledge of the
exact consequences of each choice. "32 (Surely anyone who bought the
Class A shares of Resorts International some years ago could have foreseen
that a Donald Trump might someday offer $135 a share for the fully voting

29. See Louis Lowenstein, ShareholderVoting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4
and to ProfessorGilson, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 997 (1989).
30. Richard L. Stern & Paul Bernstein, Why New Issues Are Lousy Investments,
FORBES, Dec. 2, 1985, at 152-54.
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but closely-held Class B shares while offering only $15 a share for the Class
A.)
The deeper issue here transcends the private rights of shareholders.
These Adam Smithian economists assume that shareholders own their voting
rights in the same sense that they own their automobiles. Shareholders have
rights to vote, not to be routinely traded away in private transactions
because of a fear of power without accountability that is reflected in almost
every aspect of American life and law. A "smart" economics student might
think that in the political arena votes should be for sale. Or that charitable
foundations should be allowed to accumulate wealth and power indefinitely.
Or that one generation should be able to forbid their descendants from
breaking up their landed or other estates. But as our Anglo-Saxon traditions
long ago taught us, power that is frozen for all time will soon be abused.
The fact that it was flash-frozen in a market-based IPO is irrelevant.
Count 4: Looting the Dividends
For a company on Main Street USA, owned by, say, ten shareholders,
the issue of when to pay dividends, and how much, would seem fairly
simple. Putting to one side the question of the investors' need for current
income, the central issue would be whether the surplus-the freely available
earnings of the company-would earn more for shareholders if left in the
business or if distributed to them. If the reinvestment opportunities were
not particularly attractive, shareholders would rightfully expect to see
substantial payouts. And even if the performance has been good, some
level of dividends would probably be in order. This normal pressure for
dividends would be a useful check on management.
Sounds obvious, but EMT enthusiasts have managed to distort even this
most basic issue of whether to keep the money in the corporation or return
it to the owners. Through the reductionist lens of EMT, excessive cash will
have no effect on how much is reinvested, and the normal desire of
shareholders for an income on their investment is seen as an "irrational
prejudice." ("Not only does it seem wrong," one particularly arrogant
finance consultant/professor wrote, "it is difficult to believe that sensible
folk could have held such beliefs. 133)

More importantly, they have

33. Stephen A. Ross, Comment on the Modigliani-MillerPropositions,J. ECON.
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reinforced the obvious preference of corporate managers to do what they
are only too willing to do, namely, to keep dividends as low as possible.
The problem began about thirty years ago, with a paper by Merton
Miller and Franco Modigliani so celebrated that the thesis they propounded
now goes simply by the acronym "MM."''3 Their concept was that the
value of the company in the market should not be affected by whether the
dividend rate is high or low, or even whether dividends are paid at all.
Assuming among other things that a company's investment program is
known, and assuming, too, that the financial markets are efficient, the value
of the company has been fixed and shareholders should be indifferent to
whether the current earnings are reinvested at the assumed rate of return or
are paid out. (What is not paid out as dividends will show up as capital
gains.) Scholars speak of the MM thesis as if it were a law of physics:
EMT will guarantee the "conservation of value" regardless of how the
corporate pie is capitalized or distributed.
The MM thesis is a basic tenet of modern financial theory, and literally
hundreds of papers and books have been written on the subject. The
underlying problem-and the error-is that economists and finance people
would like to think only about the impact of dividend policies on stock
prices, ignoring their impact on the business itself. M&M and their
followers simply assume that, whether the payout is high or low, whether
the company is broke or awash in cash, the size of the corporate jet and of
management's acquisition spree will remain the same. In the "rational"
world of finance, the rich and poor behave alike.
EMT provided the essential building block for the MM thesis and, of
course, encouraged this preoccupation with market pricing. The potential
for mischief here is considerable. If dividends are irrelevant, finance
scholars say, to incur the tax on dividends is a waste. Better for the
company to keep the money, all the money, they conclude. CEOs, of
course, will agree-many of them being only too ready to expand the
present business, buy-and-try a new one, or just feel as cozy as one can
only feel with plenty of cash in the drawer. EMT and its offspring, the
MM theory, legitimate these self-serving preferences.

34. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the
Valuation of Shares, 34 J.Bus. 411 (1961); see also Merton H. Miller & Franco
Modigliani, CorporateIncome Taxes andthe Cost of Capital:A Correction,53 AM. ECON.
REv. 433, 439 (1963).
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At this point, the prosecution rested. Both sides summarized their
arguments. The court tried the case without ajury, and the defendant was
found guilty on all counts. A summary of the prosecution's recommendations on sentencingfollows:
The prosecution asked that the defendant, EMT, be given a life
sentence, with no possibility of parole. (The prosecuting attorney abhors
capital punishment.) The sentence would be served by denying to all
proponents of EMT access to any computer data base of historic stock
prices.
The reason for requesting a life sentence was the heavy damage that
EMT had inflicted. Most of it had been inflicted wilfully, or at least with
a reckless disregard for the consequences. With no sign of remorse, the
possibility of further harm could not be ignored. Graham and Dodd, who
taught security analysis at Columbia, liked to say that the stock market is
not a weighing machine, but only a voting machine, whereon countless
individuals register choices which are the product partly of reason and
partly of emotion.3" EMT enthusiasts still cling to the weighing machine
as an established, "proven" concept, so much so that, according to none
other than a Columbia professor of security analysis, Graham and Dodd are
"hopelessly" out of date. Confronted with EMT's failings, the response has
been to fine tune the "weighing machine" concept, arguing that the contrary
evidence only takes small bites out of it or that EMT ought still to be used
until "someday," when something better will come along.36
As part of a rehabilitation program, the prosecution suggested that
EMT and its proponents receive a daily diet of annual reports and other
primary financial material. Conventional finance had failed to recognize,
say, the takeover bubble because of its deep disdain for accounting and
financial analysis. Thus a respected finance text, fed to once-innocent
business school students, still states as dogma that, "[i]nvestors gain little
benefit from [corporate financial statements] because they contain no new
information. "'

(Remember, the information has been "impounded"-
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instantly reflected-in the stock price.) Efficient market theorists failed to
heed, therefore, the fact that the ratio of corporate income available for
interest charges on junk bonds, which had been a reasonable if modest 2:1
at the beginning of the 1980s, had, by the mid-eighties so eroded that the
income was twenty-five percent less than the interest charges .3 Trusting
prices, blind to the predator's ball, the den of thieves, and the barbarians
at the gate, indifferent to debt, they stubbornly maintained that inflated
prices and extravagant levels of debt implied not folly but social gains.
According to Chicago School and kindred spirits, markets simply do
not fail. Instead, they blamed governments for the collapse of takeovers in
1989-for indicting Michael Milken, for permitting poison pills, for writing
state antitakeover laws, and for closing the window on junk debt.
In response to a question from the court about motives, the prosecution
said that EMT proponents had been driven by a search for elegance, a word
that crops up again and again in the literature. "Elegance" reflects
economists' desire for overarching solutions, algebraically expressed, that
will provide the key to a host of issues, and in any season, rather than the
messy, context-sensitive responses that most other social sciences produce.
Indeed, economists tend to reject the label "social science," although that
is obviously what economics is.
The pattern, the prosecution continued, is not new. Friedrich von
Hayek-not Keynes, von Hayek!-had something similar in mind in his
Nobel lecture of 1974, when he criticized economists for straining to mimic
the quantitative precision of the physical sciences. In so doing, he
observed, they were ignoring the fact that theirs is a complex- social study
in which quantitative data would be hard to find.39 He might as well have
been referring to CAPM and the like when he chided economists for
ignoring what is important in favor of that which happens to be accessible
to measurement.

The defendant was duly sentenced. When last observed, the authorities
were feeding the prisoner a diet that included the writings of Buffett, Philip
38.
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Fischer, Graham, and Keynes, enriched with corporate annual reports.
Color had returned to its cheeks, it had gained weight and was heard
repeating as a mantra, "you are neither right nor wrong because the market
agrees with you."
Dismayed by what they observed, the prisoner's relatives, CAPM and
others, visited but once. They did, however, maintain contact with one
another, meeting in a ritualized setting. Computers were booted up, votive
candles were lit, and the following prayer was said:
EMT
We believe in thee.
We are as one,
Thy will be done.

